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UCC Update: Revised Articles 3
and 4
by Michael D. Sabbath*
I.

INTRODUCTION

The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
and the American Law Institute, cosponsors of the Uniform Commercial
Code ("UCC"), have approved comprehensive changes to Articles 3 and
4. The Revised Articles were initially presented to the various states for
approval in early 1991. As of September 1996, forty-four jurisdictions
have adopted the Revised Articles, most with few, if any, variations to
the official text.' Revised Articles 3 and 4 became law in Georgia
effective July 1, 1996.2
Few debate that Prior Articles 3 and 4, which were drafted more than
forty years ago, were in need of revision. Article 3 was the most dated
article of the UCC. It was merely a revision of the previous uniform act,
the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law, which was drafted in 1896,
and was based primarily on eighteenth and nineteenth century British
case law. Some of the concepts and language of Prior Article 3 were
quite archaic. It should be noted that Revised Article 3 does not
radically depart from previous law. Revised Article 3 carries forward the

* Professor of Law, Walter F. George School of Law, Mercer University. University of
Wisconsin (B.A., 1972); Emory University (J.D., 1975); Columbia University (LL.M., 1985).
Member, State Bar of Georgia. Professor Sabbath served as Reporter for the Georgia
Corporate and Banking Law Section's Uniform Commercial Code Subcommittee on Articles
3 and 4.

1. Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware,
District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas,
Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana,
Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Dakota, Ohio,
Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont,
Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, and Wyoming.
2. See 1996 Ga. Laws 1306, §§ 3, 4.
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basic doctrines of negotiable instruments law embodied in Prior Article
3. Moreover, the organization of the new statute generally follows that
of the old statute. But the revision does update Article 3 to modernize
language and take into account technological developments and changes
in business practice. In addition, the revision resolves conflicting lines
of case authority.
Similarly, Prior Article 4 was seriously outdated, having emerged as
part of the "1958 Official Text" of the UCC. However, Magnetic Ink
Character Recognition ("MICR")-the encoding of identifying numbers
on checks that made automated check processing possible-did not
become operable until 1959. Thus, Prior Article 4, drafted in a time of
manual processing of checks, was inadequate to deal with the automated
processing of checks based on MICR technology. Prior Article 4 was
saved to some extent by section 4-103, which allows the parties to vary
the terms of that article by agreement, and provides that Federal
Reserve regulations and letters, clearinghouse rules, and the like, have
the effect of agreements.3 But the movement from a paper-based
payments system to an electronic-based payments system made it
apparent that Prior Article 4 needed to be reformed. Revised Article 4
accommodates technical developments in automated check processing
and check truncation. Although some changes have been made to
accommodate Federal Regulation CC" (which relates to mandated funds
availability), those provisions most heavily impacted by Regulation CC
remain intact and are retained for nonpreempted provisions and for
items other than checks. Although the drafting committee initially
intended to extensively coordinate Article 4 with Regulation CC, it
ultimately abandoned this effort due to the extensive preemption that
exists, and also because of the different character of the provisions in
Article 4 and Regulation CC. In addition, the Federal Reserve Board
has revised, and will continue to revise, Regulation CC administratively.
State legislative processes move much more slowly than these administrative processes, making it very difficult to keep Article 4 and
Regulation CC closely coordinated.
II.

DISCUSSION

No effort will be made here to cover every aspect of the revisions to
Articles 3 and 4. Instead, this Article will discuss some of the major new
provisions to illustrate improvements made by the revisions.

3. U.C.C. § 4-103 (1990).
4. 12 C.F.R. § 229.38(c) (1996).
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Revised Article 3

A.

1. Scope of Article 3. Revised Article 3 clarifies the types of
contracts within Article 3. For example, the confusion over whether
traveler's checks are covered has been eliminated. Traveler's checks are
governed under Revised Article 35 Although the requirement of a
countersignature is a condition to the obligation to pay, it is recognized
that traveler's checks are treated in the commercial world as money
substitutes and therefore should be governed by Article 3.6 The revision
also expressly recognizes the negotiability of, and clarifies much of the
cashier's checks, and checks that may
law with respect to, teller's checks,
7
omit "words of negotiability."
In an important provision, variable rate instruments are included as
negotiable instruments under Revised Article 3.V Prior Article 3
required that a negotiable instrument state a "sum certain."9 The
holder must be "able to determine the amount then payable from the
instrument itself.""0 Most courts considering the issue under Prior
Section 3-106 found that instruments with variable interest rates could
not be negotiable instruments because of this "sum certain" requirement." However, instruments providing for variable interest rates
pegged to some sort of fluctuating standard rate of interest are much
more common now than they were when Article 3 was originally
promulgated. The requirement of a sum certain has been completely
eliminated in Revised Article 3. Rather than a sum certain, an
instrument must show a "fixed amount of money, with or without
interest or other charges described in the promise or order." 2 Rates of
interest may be stated as "fixed or variable." 3 Thus, the revision
clearly recognizes the negotiability of variable rate instruments.
The revision also clarifies the impact of the Federal Trade Commission
"holder" rule.' 4 This federal regulation requires a conspicuous legend
in consumer notes that makes any holder subject to the claims and

5.

U.C.C. §§ 3-104(i), 3-106(c) (1990).

6. Id. § 3-106 cmt. 2.
7. Id. § 3-104.
8.
9.
10.
11.

Id. §§ 3-104(a), 3-112.
U.C.C. § 3-106 (1958).
U.C.C. § 3-106 cmt. 1 (1990).
SeegenerallyThomas G. Fischer, Annotation, Negotiabilityof Instrument Providing

for Variable Rate of Interest Under U.C.C. § 3-106, 69 A.L.R. 4th 1127 (1989).
12. U.C.C. § 3-104(a) (1990).
13. Id. § 3-112(b).
14.

16 C.F.R. § 433.2 (1996).

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48

defenses which ,the issuer could assert against the original payee.1"
Revised Article 3 makes clear that complying with the federal regulation
does not render the instrument "conditional" so as to exclude it from
Article 3.16 The revision treats such notes bearing the legend as
negotiable instruments for all purposes except that no one may be a
holder in due course of such instruments. 7
Under Prior Article 3, a promise to pay was not made conditional
(thereby destroying negotiability) if the promise was limited to payment
out of a particular fund or source, so long as the instrument was issued
by a government or governmental agency or unit." But a corporation's
or individual's promise to pay that was limited to a particular fund was
conditional, destroying negotiability." Revised Article 3 rejects this
approach, stating that a promise to pay is not made conditional "because
payment is limited to resort to a particular fund or source." 20
Finally, the revision has some special rules governing checks. Under
Revised Article 3, there is no way to destroy the negotiability of a check.
A check need not be payable to order or to bearer.2' Further, even if
a drawer prints or types the words "not negotiable" or adds a statement
that the check is not governed by Article 3, it nevertheless is negotiable.22 This change is in recognition of automated processing and avoids
prejudicing a party who takes the instrument without the ability to
notice the exclusionary language. On the other hand, a promissory note
containing similar language prevents the writing from being a negotiable
instrument for any purpose.
Of course, a court could
24 nevertheless
apply Article 3 principles to such a writing by analogy.
2. "Good Faith" and "Ordinary Care." The most significant
benefit offered to consumers by Revised Articles 3 and 4 may be the new
definition of "good faith."25 Under the prior articles, good faith was
defined as "honesty in fact."26 The new definition, found in Revised
Section 3-103(a)(4), requires both honesty in fact and "observance of

15. Id.
16.

U.C.C. § 3-106 cmt. 3 (1990).

17. Id. § 3-106(d).
18.

U.C.C. § 3-105(1)(g) (1958).

19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

Id. § 3-105(2)(b).
U.C.C. § 3-106(b) (1990).
Id. § 3-104(a), (c).
Id.§ 3-104(d).
Id. § 3-104 cmt. 2.

24. Id. § 3-104 cmt. 3.
25. Id. §§ 3-103(a)(4), 4-104(c).

26. U.C.C. § 1-201(19) (1958).
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reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing."27 This new definition
the definitions of good faith applicable to Articles 2,
is consistent with
25
2A, 4, and 4A.

"Ordinary care" was not defined generally in Prior Articles 3 and 4.
The official comments to Prior Article 4 stated that "[nJo attempt is
made in this Article to define in toto what constitutes ordinary care or
lack thereof."29 Revised Section 3-103(a)(7) contains a detailed definition of ordinary care. "Ordinary care" means, for a person engaged in
business, the "observance of reasonable commercial standards, prevailing
in the area in which the person is located, with respect to the business
in which the person is engaged." 0 Reasonable commercial standards
do not require banks that process instruments for collection or payment
by automated means to examine every instrument if the failure to
examine does not violate the bank's procedures, and if those procedures
do not vary from general banking usage."' This revision resolves a
conflict between cases holding that the use of automated procedures
which did not require the examination of every item constituted a lack
of ordinary care as a matter of law, and cases holding that the issue of
whether the use of such procedures constituted ordinary care was one of
fact.3 2 The revision is also consistent with the policy of encouraging
the rapid processing of checks and establishing a statutory framework
for accommodating a regime of truncation in which payor banks will
have to pay checks with no opportunity to see them. It should be noted,
however, that the "prevailing standards" test is not intended to shield
unreasonable bank procedures.33 Comment 5 to Revised Section 3-103
states: "Nothing in Section 3-103(a)(7) is intended to prevent a customer
from proving that the procedures followed by a bank are unreasonable,
arbitrary, or unfair."34

27.
28.
29.
30.

U.C.C. § 3-103(a)(4) (1990).
Id. § 3-104 cmt. 4.
U.C.C. § 4-103 cmt. 4 (1958).
U.C.C. § 3-103(a)(7) (1990).

31. Id.
32. Compare Medford Irrigation Dist. v. Western Bank, 676 P.2d 329 (Or. App. 1984)
(holding that automatically paying all checks under $5000 without any procedure to detect

unauthorized signatures constitutes a lack of ordinary care as a matter of law) with Wilder
Binding Co. v. Oak Park Trust & Say. Bank, 552 N.E.2d 783 (Ill. 1990) (deciding that the
question of whether a bank's use of automated check-sorting equipment and automatic
payment of checks drawn for less than $1000 without manual verification of the signatures
on those checks constitutes the exercise of ordinary care presents a genuine issue of
material fact which should be answered by the trier of fact).
33.

U.C.C. § 3-103(a)(7) cmt. 5 (1990).

34. Id.
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3. Holder in Due Course Status. A holder in due course must
take an instrument "in good faith."35 As discussed above, Revised
Article 3 has redefined good faith. Therefore, satisfying the good faith
element for qualifying as a holder in due course will require observance
of reasonable commercial standards in addition to honesty in fact. 8
Under Prior Article 3, an incomplete or irregular instrument would
prevent a purchaser from having the lack of notice of a claim or defense
required of a holder in due course. 7 It was unclear whether the claim
or defense had to relate to the irregular or incomplete nature of the
instrument. Revised Article 3 provides that apparent evidence of
forgery, alteration, irregularity, or incompleteness will prevent holder in
due course status, without regard to whether the claim or defense is
related to the problem evidenced by the face of the instrument.8
Revised Article 3 clarifies that a holder who has not paid or performed
the full consideration for an instrument has pro rata rights as a holder
in due course; such rights equal "the fraction of the amount payable
under the instrument equal to the value of the partial performance
divided by the value of the promised performance.""
Revised Article 3 expands and clarifies the rules for determining when
a person who has taken an instrument from a fiduciary has notice of
breach of that fiduciary's duty.4 A "fiduciary" includes "an agent,
trustee, partner, corporate officer or director, or other representative
owing a fiduciary duty with respect to an instrument."4 ' Revised
Section 3-307 applies if (1) an instrument is taken from a fiduciary for
payment or collection, or for value, (2) the taker has knowledge of the
fiduciary status of the fiduciary, and (3) the beneficiary makes a claim
against the transferee for the instrument or its proceeds on the ground
that her fiduciary breached his duty.42 In these circumstances, if the
taker has notice of a possible breach of fiduciary duty, the taker would
not be a holder in due course and would be liable to the beneficiary if
there is a misappropriation of the proceeds of the instrument.43 In the
case of an instrument payable to or issued by the fiduciary as such, the
taker has notice of the breach of fiduciary duty, and therefore, notice of

35. Id. § 3-302(a)(2).
36. Id § 3-103(a)(4).

37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

U.C.C. §§ 3-302(1)(c), 3-304(1)(a) (1958).
U.C.C. § 3-302(a)(1) (1990).
Id. § 3-302(d).
Id. § 3-307.
Id. § 3-307(a)(1).
Id. §3-307(b).
See id. § 1-201(20).

1996]

UCC UPDATE

the claim of the represented person, if the instrument is (1) taken in
payment of, or as security for, a debt known by the taker to be the
personal debt of the fiduciary, (2) taken in a transaction known by the
taker to be for the personal benefit of the fiduciary, or (3) deposited to
an account other than an account of the fiduciary."
4. Effect of Instrument on Underlying Obligation. The revision
expands the provisions governing the effect of an instrument on the
obligation for which it is taken. Prior Article 3 provided that an
obligation was discharged if a bank was a drawer, maker, or acceptor of
the instrument and if, "there is no recourse on the instrument against
the underlying obligor."45 For example, the underlying obligation was
not discharged if the obligor indorsed a cashier's check. Under Revised
Article 3, where a certified check, cashier's check, or teller's check is
taken for an obligation, the obligation is always discharged, although
this discharge does not affect any liability the obligor may have on the
instrument.4 6
A considerable amount of litigation occurred under prior law concerning whether Prior Section 1-207 changed the law of accord and
satisfaction. Most courts held that it did not alter pre-Code common law
on accord and satisfaction.47 A person receiving a check offered in full
payment of a pre-existing dispute waived the balance of her claim by
accepting and cashing the check. 4' The revision codifies this rule by
stating in Revised Section 1-207(2) that a payee may not cash a check
offering an accord and satisfaction with a reservation of rights and then
seek to collect the balance of the debt that would have been owed if an
accord and satisfaction had not been created.49 In addition, Revised
Article 3 protects organizational payees from inadvertently losing their
claims because of mechanical processing of full settlement checks.5"
Organizational creditors can prevent accord and satisfaction by notifying
their debtors that full satisfaction checks must be sent to a designated
location and proving that the purported full payment check was not

44. Id. § 3-307(b)(1), (2), (4).
45.

U.C.C. § 3-802(1)(a) (1958).

46. U.C.C. § 3-310(a) (1990).
47. See generallyVitaus M. Gulbis, Annotation, Application of U.C.C. § 1-207 to Avoid
Discharge of Disputed Claim Upon QualifiedAcceptance of Check Tendered as Payment In
Full, 37 A.L.R. 4th 358, 366 (1985).
48. See, e.g., Rhone v. State Auto Mut. Ins. Co., 858 F.2d 1507 (11th Cir. 1988); Food
Purveyors, Inc. v. Lindsay Meats, Inc., 153 Ga. App. 383, 265 S.E.2d 325 (1980).
49. See U.C.C. § 1-207(2) (1990).
50. See id. § 3-311(c)(1).

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48

sent. 1 A creditor desiring not to have payments sent to a separate
office and unknowingly cashing a full settlement check may prevent an
accord and satisfaction by returning the money within ninety days.5 2
5. Signatures. The revision states that the law of agency determines whether represented persons are bound by signatures.53 Prior
Section 3-401(1) stated that "[nlo person is liable on an instrument
unless his signature appears thereon."54 This language was generally
interpreted to mean that an undisclosed principal was not liable on an
instrument despite the fact that this interpretation was inconsistent
with ordinary agency law that binds an undisclosed principal on a
simple contract.55 Under56Revised Article 3, an undisclosed principal is
liable on the instrument.
Similarly, courts relied on the apparently clear language of Prior
Section 3-403(2) to hold corporate agents liable on checks drawn on
corporate accounts where the agents had signed without indicating their
representative capacity and the checks did not name the corporate
principal.57 The revision provides that, so long as the corporation is
identified on the check, an authorized signer is not personally liable,
even if the signer's agency status is not indicated. 5
Finally, under Prior Article 3, an agent was personally liable if the
instrument neither named the principal nor showed that the agent
signed in a representative capacity.59 Parol evidence was not admissible to avoid this personal liability.60 Except as against a holder in due

course, Revised Article 3 always allows an agent to prove that his
signature was made in a representative capacity, regardless of the form
of the instrument.6 1
6. Fictitious Payees, Impostors, and Faithless Employees;
Comparative Negligence. While the basic structure of the loss
allocation provisions of Prior Articles 3 and 4 is unchanged by the
revision, the drawer's responsibility in cases of impostors, fictitious

See id.
52. See id. § 3-311(cX2).
53. See id. § 3-402 cmt. 1.
54. U.C.C. § 3-401(1) (1958).
51.

55. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 190 (1958).

56.
57.
Stone
58.
59.
60.
61.

U.C.C. § 3-402(a) (1990).
See, e.g., Barnett v. Leasing Int'l, Inc., 151 Ga. App. 715, 261 S.E.2d 452 (1979);
v. First Natl Bank, 159 Ga. App. 812, 285 S.E.2d 207 (1981).
U.C.C. § 3-402(c) (1990).
U.C.C. § 3-403(2)(a) (1958).
See id. § 3-403 cmt. 3.
U.C.C. § 3-402(b)(2) (1990).
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payees, faithless employees, and negligence has been clarified and, to
some extent, expanded.
Under Prior Section 3-405(1)(a), one who impersonated another person
and obtained a check made payable to the impersonated person could
forge the check and pass good title.62 However, if the impersonator
pretended to be an agent of a principal, and the victim took the
precaution of making the check payable to the principal, the impersonator had no power to indorse the name of the principal. Thus, the
indorsement with the name of the payee-principal was a forgery and was
ineffective under Prior Article 3.63 Revised Article 3 gives the impostor
the power to negotiate the check even when the check is made out to the
impostor's purported principal.64
Prior Section 3-405(1) stated, among other things, that an indorsement
by any person "in the name of a named payee" was effective.65 Some
courts focusing on this language found that any deviation, no matter
how slight, between the indorsement and the name of the payee on the
face of the check prevented a bank from asserting Section 3-405. Thus,
the loss fell upon the bank. The revision rejects this view, providing
instead that an indorsement is made in the name of a payee if it is made
in a name substantially similar to that of the payee, or if the instrument, whether or not indorsed, is deposited in an account bearing a
substantially similar name."
Revised Section 3-405 expands the per se negligence rule in Prior
Section 3-405. Prior Section 3-405(1)(c) provided that an indorsement
by any person in the name of a named payee was effective if the agent
or employee of the maker or drawer "supplied him with the name of the
payee intending the latter to have no such interest." 7 If, at the time
the check was supplied to the employer, the employee had no intention
of forging the payee's signature and stealing the check, Prior Section 3405(1)(c) did not apply. In addition, fraudulent indorsements of the
employer's name to instruments payable to the employer were not
covered by Prior Section 3-405; the employer bore the loss in such cases
only if its negligence could be proven under Prior Section 3-406.
The faithless employee doctrine is set out in detail in Revised Section
3-405. It allocates to the employer the risk of loss for fraudulent
indorsements by employees entrusted with responsibility with respect to

62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

See U.C.C. § 3-405(1)(a) (1958).
See id. § 3-402 cmt. 2.
See U.C.C. § 3-404 cmt. 1 (1990).
U.C.C. § 3-405(1Xc) (1958).
U.C.C. § 3-404(c) (1990).
Id.
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instruments, rather than to the bank that 'takes or pays the instrument." An employee has "responsibility" if she handles instruments
in a responsible capacity.69 In cases of indorsements made in the name
of payees of instruments issued by the employer, Revised Section 3-405
applies even if, at the time the check is supplied to the employer, the
employee entrusted with responsibility has no intention of forging the
payee's name and indorsing the check.7 ° The forged indorsement would
be effective. 7 Fraudulent indorsements of the employer's name to
instruments payable to the employer also are covered by Revised Section
3-405; the fraudulent indorsement of the employer's name by the
employee entrusted with responsibility would be effective.72
Finally, Prior Section 3-405 had no language that required a bank,
seeking to avoid liability by relying on the impostor rule or fictitious
payee rule, to exercise reasonable care. This absence in Prior Section 3405 of a requirement that the bank exercise ordinary care led some
courts to conclude that the drafters intended that the drawer would be
liable without regard to the bank's negligence.7" Under Revised Article
3, a comparative negligence standard applies.7 4 It should be noted that
Prior Section 3-406 also has been revised so that negligence of the
financial institution no longer prevents it from asserting the preclusion."76 Under Revised Section 3-406, comparative negligence is now the
rule.

7. Transfer and Presentment Warranties. Prior Section 3-417
has been replaced by Revised Section 3-416, which covers transfer
warranties, and Revised Section 3-417, which covers presentment
warranties. Prompt notice of a breach of a transfer or presentment
warranty must be given or the warrantor may be discharged to the
extent of loss caused by the delayed notice. 77 Transfer and presentment warranties may not be disclaimed with respect to checks.78

68.
69.
70.

Id. § 3-405.
Id. § 3-405(a)(5).
See id. § 3-405.

71. Id.
72. Id.
73. See, e.g., Western Casualty & Sur. Co. v. Citizens Bank of Las Cruces, 676 F.2d
1344 (10th Cir. 1982); Consolidated Pub. Water Supply Dist. No. C-1 v. Farmers Bank, 686
S.W.2d 844 (Mo. App. 1985).
74. See U.C.C. § 3-405(6) (1990).
75. See id. § 3-406.
76. Id.
77. See id. §§ 3-416(c), 3-417(e).
78. Id.
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Under the revision, a warrantor, in addition to warranting that all
signatures are authentic and authorized and that the instrument has not
been altered, also warrants that she is entitled to enforce the instrument
and that "the instrument is not subject to a defense or claim in
recoupment of any party which can be asserted against the warrantor."79 Although Prior Section 3-417(3) permitted a transferor to limit
this warranty by transferring "without recourse,""0 Revised Section 3416 deletes this provision.
Even if the transferee takes as a holder in due course who takes free
of the defense or claim in recoupment, the warranty gives the
transferee the option of proceeding against the transferor rather than
litigating with the obligor on the instrument the issue of the holder-indue-course status of the transferee."'
With regard to an unauthorized drawer's signature, the revision
retains the rule of Price v. Neal. 2 Unless the party presenting the
instrument knows that the drawer's signature was unauthorized, the
83
drawee takes the risk that the drawer's signature was unauthorized.
A drawer may sue on a presentment warranty only when presentment
is made to the drawer with respect to a dishonored draft." A drawee
who seeks recovery for breach of warranties based on an unauthorized
indorsement or alteration is subject to the defense that the indorsement
is effective, or that the drawer is precluded from raising the forgery or
alteration.'
In addition, the revision clarifies that a drawee may have a right of
restitution for mistaken payment, but preserves the finality of payment
of Price v. Neal as to holders in due course and reliance payaspect
6
ees.8

8. Conversion of Instruments. Revised Section 3-420 replaces
Prior Section 3-419, and clarifies a number of points. Revised Section
3-420(a) settles a split in authority by providing that neither the drawer
of a check, nor a payee who has failed to receive the check, may sue for
conversion of that check. 7 The revision also addresses the problem of

79. Id. § 3-416(a)(4).

80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

U.C.C. § 3-417(3) (1958).
U.C.C. § 3-416 cmt. 3 (1990).
97 Eng. Rep. 871 (K.B. 1762).
See U.C.C. § 3-417(a)(3) (1990).
See id. § 3-417(d).
See id. § 3-417(e), 3-404 to -406.
See id. § 3-418.
Id. § 3-420.
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conversion actions in multiple payee cases when payment is made over
Prior Section 3-419 was silent on the
a missing indorsement."
measure of recovery when a joint payee wrongfully collected without the
necessary signature of her joint payee. Revised Section 3-420(b) states
that in an action for conversion, "the measure of liability is presumed to
be the amount payable on the instrument, but recovery may not exceed
the amount of the plaintiff's interest in the instrument. 9
The revision's most significant change relates to conversion actions
against depositary banks. Prior Section 3-419(3) provided that when a
depositary bank, in good faith and in observance of reasonable commercial standards, dealt with an instrument or its proceeds on behalf of one
who was not the true owner, it was "not liable in conversion or otherwise
to the true owner beyond the amount of any proceeds remaining in his
hands."90 Often there were no proceeds left, and the rightful owner
would be required to bring her conversion against the payor bank or
banks. Yet the depositary bank was ultimately liable in the case of a
forged indorsement under warranty theory, and it was often the most
convenient defendant, especially in cases involving multiple checks
drawn on different banks. 9' Revised Section 3-420 deletes this "proceeds remaining" clause, and now the depositary bank is fully liable. 92
9. Suretyship Defenses. Because most instruments contain
enforceable waiver provisions, suretyship defenses seldom come into play
in commercial transactions. The revision continues to permit waiver to
occur "either specifically or by general language indicating that parties
waive defenses based on suretyship or impairment of collateral."9
Nevertheless, litigation continues to arise in situations where no waiver
has occurred. Revised Section 3-605 clarifies most of the issues
commonly litigated, such as who has the impairment of collateral
defenses (both sureties and makers) and what constitutes impairment
of collateral. The defenses available are extended to include material
modifications of the obligation, but are generally limited to the extent of
actual prejudice."

88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

Id.
Id.§ 3-420(b).
U.C.C. § 3-419(3) (1958).
U.C.C. § 3-420 cmt. 3 (1990).
See id. § 3-420.
Id. § 3-605(i).
See id. § 3-605.
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B. Revised Article 4
1. Scope, Definitions, and General Provisions. Since Articles 3
and 4 were originally drafted, the world of financial institutions has
changed dramatically. The term "bank" no longer means simply
"commercial bank." Revised Article 4 expands the definition of bank to
include thrifts and credit unions so that their checks are governed by the
UCC.
Revised Article 4 also clarifies that checks written on credit
lines and asset accounts are included." However, debit and credit card
slips are explicitly excluded, leaving them to be governed by system
agreements and rules.97
Revised Article 4 incorporates the Revised Article 3 definition of "good
faith."9 8 This includes honesty in fact and the observance of reasonable
commercial standards of fair dealing. 9
Prior Sections 3-120 and 3-121 have been rewritten and consolidated
into Revised Section 4-106. The revision specifies that a payablethrough item must be presented to the drawee only by or through the
designated bank."° For collection purposes, a bank often is named on
a draft that is drawn on a nonbank drawee. Absent clear indication to
the contrary, the revision treats the bank as a collecting bank, and not
as a codrawee subject to the payor's midnight deadline.' 0 ' This
overturns contrary case law."12 It should be noted, however, that
Regulation CC treats a payable-through bank as a paying bank for the
purposes of "expeditious return" of dishonored items."3 Therefore, if
dishonored payable-through items are not returned expeditiously under
Regulation CC rules based on the time of presentment to the payablethrough bank, the payable-through bank may be liable for damages
under Regulation CC for nonexpeditious return.
Revised Section 4-111 creates a uniform three year statute of
limitations for actions to enforce an obligation, duty, or right arising

95.
96.
97.

See id. §§ 3-103(c), 4-105(i).
See id § 4-104(a)(1).
Id. § 4-104(a)(9).

98.
99.
100.
101.

Id. § 4-104(c).
See id. § 3-103(a)(4).
Id. § 4-106(a)(ii).
Id. § 4-106(c).

102.

See, e.g., Reynolds-Wilson Lumber Co. v. Peoples Nat'l Bank, 699 P.2d 146 (Okla.

1985) (finding bank named along with a nonbank drawee as a co-drawee),
103. See 12 C.F.R. § 229.2(z)(4) (1996).
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under Article 4.104 Prior Article 4 had no express statute of limitations.
2. Accommodating Modern Technology. Changes made to
accommodate modern technology and check processing practices best
illustrate the need for Revised Article 4. For example, the process of
posting was designed as an early cutoff point for payment, or matters
such as stop payment, garnishment, and the like. However, the process
of posting contemplates human involvement that is no longer consistent
with automated processing. Revised Article 4 has eliminated all
references to the process of posting. Because completion of the process
of posting is eliminated as a cutoff, Revised Section 4-303(a)(5) permits
banks to establish a cutoff hour for the four legals as early as one hour
after the opening of the banking day after receipt of the check.0'°
Prior Section 4-205(1) permitted depositary banks to supply missing
indorsements of their customers."0 6 Revised Section 4-205(1) now
makes the depositary bank a holder if its nonindorsing customer was a
holder; the bank need not physically supply its customer's indorsement.'0 7
Under Prior Articles 3 and 4, postdated checks were not properly
payable until the date stated.' 5 This rule caused problems because
the automated check processing system paid checks upon presentment
without regard to the date of the check. The revision addresses this
situation by permitting a bank to charge a customer's account for a
check paid before its date unless the customer provides the bank with
a timely and sufficient notice of postdating. 0 9
Because Prior Article 4 was drafted at the dawn of automated
processing, it provided no rules for misencoding. Depositary banks or
their customers now encode checks with magnetic ink, thus enabling
payor banks to electronically read the amount of the check, the identity
of the payor bank, and the identity of the customer. Problems arise
when checks are either underencoded or overencoded. Revised Section
4-209(a) provides that the person who encodes information warrants to

104. U.C.C. § 4-111 (1990).
105. Id. § 4-303(a)(5).
Any knowledge, notice, or stop payment order received by, any legal process

served upon, or any right of setoff exercised by a payor bank is too late to affect
the bank's rights or duties with respect to an item if they are received, served or
exercised after the time limit specified in Section 4-303.
106. See U.C.C. § 4-205(1) (1958).
107. See U.C.C. § 4-205(1) (1990).
108. See U.C.C. §§ 3-114(2), 4-104(1) (1958).
109. See U.C.C. § 4-401(c) (1990).
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the collection chain that the information is encoded correctly."0 A
good faith recipient of a warranty may recover from the warrantor as
damages the loss suffered as a result of the breach, plus expenses and
loss of interest."'
Midnight deadline litigation clogged the courts under Prior Article 4.
Revised Section 4-302(a) retains the rule of Prior Section 4-302(a) that
a payor bank is responsible for an item if it keeps the item without
settling it beyond midnight of the day of receipt, or it does not pay or
return the item or send notice of dishonor until after its midnight
deadline-midnight of the banking day following the banking day of
receipt."12 Revised Section 4-302(b) states that liability of the payor
bank for not meeting midnight deadlines is subject to defenses based on
breach-of-presentment warranties."' It also codifies the line of cases
that excuse delay beyond the midnight deadline when the person
presenting the item was attempting to defraud the bank."4 For
example, a presenter who knows that a drawer's account is insufficient
would be barred from claiming a breach of the midnight deadline rule by
the payor bank. Revised Section 4-214(a) resolves conflicting lines of
authority by providing that a collecting bank that fails to meet its
midnight deadline does not necessarily lose its right to chargeback; a
only to the extent of damages for any loss
collecting bank loses its rights
6
delay."
the
from
resulting
Due to the Expedited Funds Availability Act" 6 and Regulation CC,
electronic developments, and the desire to reduce costs in the banking
industry, check truncation has developed. With truncation, a depositary
or other collecting bank retains the physical item while presentment is
made electronically. The revision provides for presentment by means of
a "presentment notice" pursuant to an "agreement for electronic
presentment."" 7 A person who retains an item pursuant to an agreement warrants to banks in the collection chain and the payor that the
retention and presentment comply with the agreement."'
In addition, the substantial revisions to Prior Section 4-406 facilitate
truncation. Revised Section 4-406 authorizes a descriptive bank
statement that permits the bank to supply only the item number,

110. Id. § 4-209(a).
111.

Id. § 4-209(c).

112. Id. § 4-302(a).

113. Id. § 4-302(b).
114. See id.
115. See id. § 4-214(a).
116. 12 U.S.C. §§ 4001-4010 (1990).
117. U.C.C. § 4-110 (1990).

118. Id. § 4-209(b).
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amount, and date of payment." 9 Currently, the Magnetic Ink Character Recognition line cannot supply the name of the payee and item date.
It should be noted that the customer must only notify the bank of
unauthorized payments that reasonably should have been discovered
based on the statement provided to that customer. 2 ° As technology
allows more information to b made available, the self interest of the
bank, as well as competitive forces, will likely induce the provision of
additional information. The party possessing the items must either
retain them or, if the items are destroyed, be able to furnish legible
copies of them for a period of seven years after their receipt. 2 ' The
bank that paid the item must be able to provide the item or a copy
thereof within a reasonable time after request by the customer.'22 The
bank, as previously discussed, does not fail to exercise ordinary care
merely because it does not examine every item. 2 ' If both the bank
and the customer fail to exercise ordinary care, a comparative negligence
standard prevails.' 24 The outside time limit for a customer to report
successive forgeries or alterations is increased from the fourteen days in
Prior Section 4-406 to thirty days in Revised Section 4-406(d) in
recognition of the fact that customer check volume has increased
significantly. 2 ' Finally, Revised Section 4-406(f) retains the notion
that regardless of care or lack thereof by either the customer or the
bank, a customer is precluded from asserting a claim against the bank
unless the customer discovers and reports an unauthorized signature or
alteration within one year. 6 Prior Section 4-406(4) provided that a
customer must discover and report an unauthorized payee's signature to
the drawee bank within three years after the customer receives the
item. "27
' Revised Article 4 deletes this concept.
One should note that Georgia's Prior Section 4-406 varied from the
official text of Prior Section 4-406.28 Under Georgia's Prior Section 4406(4), a customer had sixty days (not one year) to report his unauthorized signature or alteration, and one year (not three years) to report an
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120.
121.
122.
123.
124.

See id. § 4-406.
Id. § 4-406(c).
Id. § 4-406(b).
Id.
See id. §§ 3-103(a)(7), 4-104(c).
See id. § 4-406(e).

125.
126.
127.
128.

Id. § 4-406(d).
Id. § 4-406(f).
U.C.C. § 4-406(4) (1958).
See O.C.G.A. § 11-4-406 (1994).
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unauthorized indorsement.'29 As is discussed later, this variation is
retained in Georgia's version of Revised Article 4.13 °
3. Additional Substantive Changes. Revised Section 4-403(a)
states that a "customer or any person authorized to draw on an account
if there is more than one person may stop payment of any item drawn
on the customer's account .

.

. ."'

Thus, it makes clear that any

person that can draw on an account can stop payment of an item drawn
on that account. It also makes explicit that a nonsigning customer is not
liable for an overdraft on a joint account unless the person benefits from
the proceeds of the item.
Another clarification involves the common law "trader rule," under
which a businessperson need not prove actual damages to recover
substantial damages for wrongful dishonor. Prior Section 4-402 provided
that "when the dishonor occurs through mistake," liability was limited
to actual damages proved.'32 This language led some courts to conclude that the trader rule survived in cases involving dishonor for
33 Revised Section
reasons other than mistake.
4-402 unequivocally
34
eliminates the trader rule.
Revised Section 4-402(c) also allows a bank to check the account
balance of its customer once within its midnight deadline and not be
liable if it dishonors on that basis if a subsequent credit arrives.' 35
This provision is in line with general banking practice in dealing with
checks by automated means and confirms agreements that so provide.
III.

CRITICISMS OF REVISED ARTICLES 3 AND 4

There appears to be universal agreement that Prior Articles 3 and 4
were seriously outdated. It also is generally agreed that Revised Articles
3 and 4 are well drafted, and that they serve to clarify the law and
accommodate changing business practices. However, several commentators have expressed concern over the approach of Revised Articles 3 and
4 to consumer issues.
For example, under Revised Article 4 a bank may pay a postdated
check prior to the stated date unless the customer gives the bank timely

129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135,

Id. § 11-4-406(4).
Id. § 11-4-406(f) (Supp. 1996).
U.C.C. § 4-403(a) (1990).
U.C.C. § 4-402 (1958).
See, e.g., Elizarraras v. Bank of El Paso, 631 F.2d 366 (5th Cir. 1980).
See U.C.C. § 4-402 (1990).
See id. § 4-402(c).

MERCER LAW REVIEW

100

[Vol. 48

notice of the postdating."M Although this seems reasonable given the
technology used by most banks, concern exists that Revised Article 4
neither requires banks to inform their customers of the need to notify,
nor does it regulate fees that banks may charge their customers for a
notice of postdating."3 7 Comment 3 to Revised Section 4-401 recognizes
that fees are not regulated, but points out that courts have reviewed fees
and the bank's exercise of discretion to set fees "under principles of law
such as unconscionability or good faith and fair dealing." 3 ' Some
commentators are concerned that this may not afford consumers
adequate protection from unscrupulous practices.1 39 Although no state
specifically requires banks to inform their customers of the notice
requirement regarding postdated checks, a few states have chosen to
modify the language of Revised Article 4 and regulate fees that banks
may charge for a notice of postdating. West Virginia, for example,
requires banks to accept a specified number of notices without
charge. 40 Washington denies banks the right to charge their customers any fee for notice of postdating.14 ' However, most states have
adopted the revision as written.
Similar concerns have been expressed about Revised Section 4-406.
Although Revised Section 4-406(b) requires a bank to provide requested
checks or legible copies of checks to its customers, it sets no definite time
limit; the bank must act "in a reasonable time." 142 In addition, the
revision is silent concerning the fee that can be charged to the customer
for providing these checks or copies. A few states have modified Revised
Section 4-406 to require banks to produce a specified number of canceled
checks to customers free of charge.14 Most states, however, have
adopted the revision as written.

136. See id. § 4-401(c).
137. See generally Mark E. Budnitz, The Revision of U.C.C. Articles Three and Four:
A Process Which Excluded Consumer Protection Requires FederalAction, 43 MERCER L.
REV. 827 (1992); Gail K. Hillebrand, Revised Articles 3 and 4 of the Uniform Commercial
Code: A Consumer Perspective, 42 ALA. L. REv. 679 (1991).
138. U.C.C. § 4-401 cmt. 3 (1990).
139. See, e.g., Mark E. Budnitz, Consumer Issues in Revised Articles 3 and 4, 47
CONSUMER L. Q. REP. 119 (1993).

140. See W. VA. CODE § 46-4-401(c) (1996) (requiring banks to accept nine such notices
each year for each account without charge).
141.
142.
143.

See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 62A.4-401(c) (West 1995).
U.C.C. § 4-406(b) (1990).
See, e.g., CAL. COM. CODE § 4406(b) (West 1995) (banks must furnish free of charge

two items per statement to customers upon request); NH. REV. STAT. ANN. § 382-A:4-406
(1995) (banks shall provide upon request and without charge 10 items or copies of items
per statement); W. VA. CODE § 46-4-406(g) (1996) (customer may request 18 checks per

year free of charge).
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There also has been some criticism of the introduction of comparative
negligence concepts through Revised Section 3-406(b) and 4-406(e).
Under Prior Section 3-406, even if a customer's negligence substantially
contributed to a material alteration or unauthorized signature, the loss
nevertheless shifted to the bank unless it paid the check "in good faith
and in accordance with the reasonable commercial standards" of the
Similarly, under Prior Section 4-406(3), if a
bank's business.'"
customer failed to exercise ordinary care and promptness in examining
bank statements and in notifying the bank, the loss still fell on the bank
"if the customer establishe[d] lack of ordinary care on the part of the
bank in paying the item(s)."145 Under Revised Article 4, the loss does
46
not automatically fall on a bank that fails to exercise ordinary care.
Instead, a comparative negligence scheme operates, allocating the loss
the failure of each to
between the customer and the bank to the extent
147
exercise ordinary care contributed to the loss.

Professor Mark Budnitz is concerned that this scheme may force a
consumer into costly litigation in order to show exactly how negligent
the bank was as compared to the consumer.'4 He believes that this
However, the provisions concerning
will discourage settlements. 49
comparative negligence contained in Revised Articles 3 and 4 are
consistent with similar provisions found in Regulation CC.50 Under
Regulation CC, if a person, including a bank, fails to exercise ordinary
care or act in good faith in indorsing a check, accepting a returned check
or notice of nonpayment, or otherwise, the damages that person may
have sustained are diminished in proportion to the amount of negligence
or bad faith attributable to that person.15 '
Another commentator, Gail Hillebrand, would like Revised Articles 3
and 4 to deal with numerous other issues faced by consumers concerning
checking accounts. 5 ' She points out that consumers need access to
affordable checking accounts and check cashing services.'53 Hillebrand
suggests that banks be required to cash government checks for
nondepositors for a set fee such as one dollar per check, and be required
to offer low-cost, limited-use checking accounts to persons at qualifying

144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.

U.C.C. § 3-406 (1958).
Id. § 4-406(3).
See U.C.C. § 3-406(b), 4-406(e) (1990).
Id.
See Budnitz, supra note 137, at 839.
Id.
See 12 C.F.R. § 229.38(c) (1996).
Id.
See Hillebrand, supra note 137.
Id. at 711.
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low-income levels.'
She believes that fees charged on consumer
accounts for ancillary procedures should be controlled by statute, and
that state lawmakers should consider the desirability of standardized
disclosures of the cost of checking accounts.155 She believes that such
matters could be dealt with as part of the revisions to Articles 3 and
4.156

Professor Fred Miller has defended the Revised Articles 3 and 4
approach of not differentiating the rules between commercial and
consumer transactions.'5 7 He gives four justifications for his position.
First, the debate over consumer provisions may preclude or destroy the
necessary consensus on the commercial law. The experience with the
failed New Payments Code demonstrates this.'
Second, for the most part, the UCC is not a regulatory statute.
Consumer provisions are regulatory in nature, cannot be made subject
to variation by agreement, and require sanctions for violation to ensure
compliance. Differentiating the rules between commercial and consumer
transactions would generate a rigidity that is particularly inappropriate
in a statute like the UCC that needs flexibility to accommodate evolving
and changing practices, procedures, and technologies. 59
Third, consumer law in relation to Articles 3 and 4 has grown outside
of the UCC and as an appendage to it in the area of commercial paper.
Therefore, state consumer law relating to drafts and notes is not uniform
across the country. Some states have more consumer protection statutes
than others. A statute to be enacted nationally, like the UCC, which
contained extensive consumer provisions (assuming a consensus could be
reached on what they should be) could serve well in states with little
prior protective legislation. However, it is unlikely that such a statute
would be accepted in lieu of established provisions in those states where
extensive provisions already have been negotiated. 1 °
Fourth, Articles 3 and 4 must facilitate, not hamper, the nationwide
check system in fimctioning at maximum efficiency for the benefit of all
its users, and in minimizing financial institution risk.'6 ' Most consumer provisions are inconsistent with this design because they
generally promote the individual customer's interest over the interest of

154. Id. at 713.
155. Id. at 717.
156. Id. at 719.
157. See FRED MILLER, NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE
LAWS, The Approach of Reuised UCC Articles 3 and 4 to Consumer Issues (1991).

158. Id. at 1.
159.
160.

Id.
Id.

161. Id. at 2.

1996]

UCC UPDATE

103

the system and its users as a whole. Such provisions increase costs,
which institutions in turn recover by spreading the cost over all the
institution's customers.
Professor Miller insists that he is not repudiating consumer protection
provisions. He concludes that "if extensive consumer protection
provisions are deemed desirable after careful consideration of a proper
balance in a particular jurisdiction, separate provisions should be
enacted. This has been the tested historical approach of the UCC."6 2
IV. GEORGIA VARIATIONS FROM THE OFFICIAL TEXT
A subcommittee of the Corporate and Banking Law Section of the
State Bar of Georgia carefully reviewed Revised Articles 3 and 4, and
considered the variations that had been enacted in several states. It
also considered the concerns expressed by some regarding consumer
issues.
The subcommittee recognized that the goal of uniformity should be
given considerable weight in deciding whether to vary from the official
text of the UCC. Although subcommittee members expressed some
concerns about the treatment of certain consumer-related issues, the
subcommittee concurred with the Permanent Editorial Board's view that
consumer protection matters generally should be dealt with outside of
the UCC. The subcommittee believed that Revised Articles 3 and 4 are
generally well-drafted, and do much to clarify and modernize the law
governing negotiable instruments and bank collections. It recommended
that Revised Articles 3 and 4 (along with conforming amendments to
Article 1) should be adopted with just a few variations from the official
text. The appropriate governing bodies of the State Bar of Georgia
approved the recommendation, and the Revised Articles were presented
to and approved by the Georgia General Assembly during the 1996
legislative session. However, Georgia's version of Revised Articles 3 and
4 does contain variations from the official text.
The official text of Revised Section 4-406(f) states:
Without regard to care or lack of care of either the customer or the
bank, a customer who does not within one year after the statement or
items are made available to the customer (subsection (a)) discover and
report the customer's unauthorized signature on or any alteration on
the item is precluded from asserting against the bank the unauthorized
signature or alteration. If there is a preclusion under this subsection,
the payor bank may not recover for breach of warranty under Section

162. Id.
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4-208 with respect to the unauthorized signature or alteration to which
the preclusion applies."
Georgia adopted the official text of Revised Section 4-406, except that
Georgia's Revised Section 4-406(f) leaves the reporting deadlines at the
sixty day and one year time periods that existed under Georgia's Prior
Section 4-406."4 The sixty day and one year reporting deadlines
appear to have worked well in Georgia for many years. These deadlines
were retained in an effort to combat fraud-an increasing problem for
banks, especially in connection with large commercial accounts.
Georgia's Revised Section 4-406(f) now provides:
Without regard to care or lack of care of either the customer or the
bank, a customer who does not within 60 days after the statement or
items are made available to the customer (subsection (a) of this Code
section) discover and report the customer's unauthorized signature on
or any alteration on the face of the item or who does not within one
year from that time discover and report any unauthorized indorsement
or alteration on the back of the item is precluded from asserting
against the bank the unauthorized signature, indorsement, or
alteration.
If there is a preclusion under this subsection, the payor bank may
not recover for breach of warranty under Code Section 11-4-208 with
respect to the unauthorized signature or alteration to which the
preclusion applies.1"
Georgia also has retained two other nonuniform provisions found in
Georgia's Prior Sections 3-508(3) and 3-603(3). Georgia's Revised Section
3-503(b) now provides:
Notice of dishonor may be given by any person. Notice of dishonor may
be given by any commercially reasonable means, including an oral,
written, or electronic communication. Notice of dishonor is sufficient
if it reasonably identifies the instrument and indicates that the
instrument has been dishonored or has not been paid or accepted.
Return of an instrument given to a bank for collection is sufficient
notice of dishonor. Upon request of any party to the instrument, the
drawee shall provide a statement to the requesting party giving the
specific reason for dishonor,and the drawee shall have no additional
liability to the drawer as a result of such statement.16

163. U.C.C. § 4-406(f) (1990).
164. O.C.G.A. § 11-4-406(f) (Supp. 1996).
165. Id.
166. Id. § 11-3-503(b) (italics indicates the nonuniform portion of this subsection
retained from Georgia's Prior Section 3-508(3)).
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Georgia's Revised Section 3-602 was amended to add subsection (c)
which provides:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this article, with respect to a
note which is a negotiable instrument within the meaning of this article
and which is to be paid off in installmentpayments or in more than one
payment, the maker or drawer is authorized to pay the assignor until

the assignee or its authorized agent sends a registeredor certified letter
to the maker or drawerat the maker's or drawer'slast known address
notifying the maker or drawer that the amount due or to become due
has been assigned and that payment is to be made to the assignee. A
notification that does not reasonably identify the rights assigned is
ineffective. If requested by the drawer or maker, the assignee must
furnish reasonable proof that the assignment has been made and,
the assignee does so, the maker or drawer may pay the assignunless
67
or.1

It was also necessary to amend the official text of Revised Section 3118, which provides for a statute of limitations on actions to enforce
notes and drafts. 6 ' Under this section, if a note is payable at a
definite time, a six year limitations period starts at the due date of the
note, subject to prior acceleration.6 9 If a note is payable on demand,
there are two limitations periods. If a demand for payment is made to
the maker, a six year limitations period starts to run when the demand
is made. 170 An action to enforce the note is barred if no demand has
been made on the note and no payment of interest or principal has been
made for a continuous period of ten years.17 ' The Official Code of
Georgia Annotated ("O.C.G.A.") section 9-3-23 currently provides that:
"Actions upon bonds or other instruments under seal shall be brought
within 20 years after the right of action has accrued. No instrument
shall be considered under seal unless so recited in the body of the
instrument. " 172 It was believed that the twenty year limitation period
for sealed instruments should not be disturbed by the UCC. Revised
Section 3-118 was amended to make clear that its limitations periods do
not apply to instruments under seal. Subsection (h) was added to
Georgia's Revised Section 3-118 which provides: "This Code section does

167.
retained
168.
169.

Id. § 11-3-602(c) (italics indicates the nonuniform portion of this subsection
from Georgia's Prior Section 3-603(3)).
U.C.C. § 3-118(a) (1990).
Id.

170. Id. § 3-118(b)
171. Id. § 3-118(c).
172. O.C.G.A. § 9-3-23 (1982).
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not apply to sealed instruments, which are governed by the provisions
of Code Section 9-3-23."' 7s
O.C.G.A. Section 9-3-24 also was amended. That section previously
provided that:
All actions upon promissory notes, drafts, or other simple contracts in
writing shall be brought within six years after the same become due
and payable. However, this Code section shall not apply to actions for
the breach of contracts for the sale of goods under Article 2 of Title
11.174

This section was amended by deleting the phrase "promissory notes,
drafts, or other."175 Thus, the limitations periods set out in the
Revised Section 3-118 now apply to notes (not under seal) and drafts.
O.C.G.A. section 9-3-24 was amended to provide:
All actions upon simple contracts in writing shall be brought within six
years after the same become due and payable. However, this Code
section shall not apply to actions for the breach of contracts for the sale
of goods under Article 2 of Title 11 or to negotiable instruments under
Article 3 of Title 11.176
In order to provide additional consumer protection and to enhance the
check truncation programs adopted by banks and other financial
institutions, the Georgia Evidence Code 177 was amended by adding
O.C.G.A. section 24-4-23.1 which provides:
(a) As used in this Code section:
(1)"Bank" means any person engaged in the business of banking and
includes, in addition to a commercial bank, a savings and loan association, savings bank, or credit union; and
(2) "Check" means a draft, other than a documentary draft, payable
on demand and drawn on a bank, even though it is described by
another term, such as "share draft" or "negotiable order of withdrawal."
(b) In any dispute concerning payment by means of a check, a copy of
the check produced in accordance with Code Section 24-5-26, together
with the original bank statement that reflects payment of the check by
the bank on which it was drawn or a copy thereof produced in the same
manner, creates a presumption that the check has been paid.17

173. Id. § 11-3-118(h) (Supp. 1996).

174. Id. § 9-3-24 (1981).
175.
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177.
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Id. § 9-3-24 (Supp. 1996).
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Id. 99 24-1-1 to -154 (1995 & Supp. 1996).
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